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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. The 2006 elections were a moment of great hope for the DRC, as the country and its people 
moved out of the shadow of one of the most destructive conflicts the world has known. The 
international community has invested heavily in the years since. Official development assistance 
since the end of the post-war transition totals more than $14 billion1. External funding makes 
up nearly half of the DRC’s annual budget2. The UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, costs 
more than $1 billion a year3. The international financial institutions have buttressed the DRC’s 
economy, most importantly through writing off 4 $12.3 billion debt and granting access to IMF 
loans. Trade deals, notably the one struck with China5, push the aggregate figure up still further. 
2. Taking stock of progress as the DRC moves through its second post-war electoral cycle is 
sobering. Investment has not resulted in meaningful change in the lives of ordinary Congolese. 
The country is now in last place in the annual UNDP development rankings, 187th out of 187 
countries6. Despite slight improvements, life expectancy and child mortality are  below average 
for the region. National income per capita is less than 50 cents a day7. The DRC will miss all of its 
Millennium Development Goals. 1.7 million Congolese are displaced8, a further 500,000 refugees 
outside the country9. There are worrying signs of renewed conflict in the East. The investment of 
billions of dollars has had little impact on the average Congolese citizen. 
3. The central cause of this suffering is continued insecurity. The Congolese government’s inability 
to protect its people or control its territory undermines progress on everything else. An effective 
security sector - organized, resourced, trained and vetted - is essential to solving problems 
from displacement, recruitment of child soldiers and gender-based violence, to economic 
growth or the trade in conflict minerals. This is not a new finding. The imperative of developing 
effective military, police and judicial structures has been repeatedly emphasized. Yet, far from 
showing sustained improvement, Congolese security forces continue posing a considerable 
threat to the civilian population rather than protecting them10. The recent allegations of an 
army Colonel leading his troops to engage in widespread rape and looting of villages near Fizi 
in 2011 underscores the fact that failed military reform can lead to human rights violations11. 
The military – the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) - has 
been accused of widespread involvement in the most serious human rights violations. Police 
corruption is endemic, and almost any form of judicial protection out of reach for the vast 
majority12. 
4. The root of the failure to implement security sector reform (SSR) is a lack of political will at the 
highest levels of the Congolese Government. Rather than articulating a vision for Congolese 
security and marshaling assistance to achieve it, the Government has instead encouraged 
divisions among the international community and allowed corrupt networks within the security 
services to flourish, stealing the resources intended to pay basic salaries or profiting from 
exploitation of natural resources. Unless this is changed, sustainable reform will be impossible. 
The investment made by Congo’s partners could be wasted, and Congo’s people will continue to 
suffer.  
5. The international community also bears significant responsibility. The DRC’s international 
partners have been politically incoherent and poorly coordinated. Little has been spent on 
security sector reform, despite its paramount strategic importance - official development aid 
disbursed for conflict, peace and security totaled just $530 million between 2006 and 2010, 
roughly 6% of total aid excluding debt relief. Spending directly on security system management 
and reform is even lower, $84.79 million over the same period, just over 1%13. A lack of political 
cohesion after 2006 undermined effective joint pressure on the Congolese government14. Poor 
coordination resulted in piecemeal interventions driven by competing short-term imperatives. 
The resulting failures have led many to give up on systemic reform altogether.
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6. This is unsustainable and unacceptable. The DRC’s external partners, old and new, must take a 
stand on SSR. As the dust settles after the 2011 presidential elections, many of the DRC’s partners 
are reassessing their programs15. The international community must take this opportunity to be 
more forceful in pressing the DRC government to engage in reform. If international donors acted 
in concert, and effectively capitalized on their political and economic investment in the DRC, they 
could positively influence DRC government behavior. Their full weight needs to be brought to bear.
7. The international community therefore needs to create a new pact with the Congolese 
government, one that puts in place clear conditions and benchmarks for progress on achieving 
army reform and minimizing harm to the population in return for continued assistance and 
recognition. These benchmarks must be based on positive efforts to achieve change. A strategic 
plan for military reform must be implemented, and a high-level body to coordinate on-going 
programs set up. And steps must be taken to improve the protection of Congolese civilians, 
through minimizing human rights abuses carried out by the security forces, and prosecuting 
the worst offenders.  
8. This new pact must transcend traditional donors. China will need peace in the DRC for 
future generations to reap the rewards from its investment. South Africa also has huge and 
growing economic interests in the DRC. Angola has pressing issues of national security at 
stake. All need the stability that can only come from effective SSR. The international financial 
institutions (IFI) have rewarded the stabilization of Congo’s macro-economic situation with 
significant support16. They must recognize that continued growth will be dependent on new 
investment, which in turn demands security. Regional organizations, most importantly the 
African Union (AU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC), need to play 
an active role in marshaling effective pressure, and providing a framework for discussion. 
Critically, this pact must also include the Congolese population. Congolese civil society must 
have a key voice in defining a global vision for Congo’s security, and connecting high-level 
reform processes with those that matter most, Congo’s people. 
9. And the new pact must happen now. Flawed presidential elections have been completed. The 
DRC’s relations with its neighbors have improved significantly in recent years. Though security 
in the DRC is precarious, and there are worrying signs of a resurgence of violence in the East, 
challenges to the Congolese government from non-state armed actors have receded. In fact, the 
biggest threats perhaps now come from within the army itself. The government needs effective 
SSR, particularly of the military, to rebuild its reputation at home and abroad, an imperative 
reflected by President kabila in his speech to the UN General Assembly in November 201117. 
Since the elections there have been some promising signs of greater receptivity on the part 
of the Congolese government18. The opportunity to engage in an honest dialogue with the 
Government must not be missed. 
10. Though the picture painted above is bleak, it is leavened with hope. There are signs that, with 
the right will and appropriate support, change is possible. Increased numbers of prosecutions 
for sexual violence (including of a senior officer19) and the reintegration of child soldiers show 
that justice can be done. FARDC formations trained by the US, South Africa and Belgium 
have performed well in intervening in delicate domestic environments. A census of military 
personnel is nearly complete. If these glimmers of hope are to be sustained and magnified, 
robust action is necessary. With the right political will in kinshasa, endemic corruption can be 
tackled, salaries paid, and the worst abusers removed. Once the right conditions are in place, 
the long term and large scale work so clearly necessary – reducing the size of both police and 
military through retirement or new demobilization programs, vetting, reinforcing capacity and 
increasing the combat effectiveness of troops – can begin in earnest.
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
To the Congolese Government
Recognize the urgent need for serious reform to create an effective, professional security 
sector, especially the military. Overcome previous suspicions and engage positively with the 
international community in building a new coalition to assist with SSR efforts. Ensure that the 
voices of the Congolese people are heard in elaborating a new vision for security in the DRC. 
1. Renew political commitment to security sector reform at the highest levels. Make military 
reform a top political priority of the new government. Remove from office those individuals 
that are obstructing SSR and take all necessary steps to achieve effective reform.
2. Urgently develop and implement a global vision for security and defense in the DRC in 
collaboration with Parliament and Congolese civil society, and implement a strategic action 
plan for achieving the vision of the FARDC set out in legislation. Request international 
expertise or assistance as appropriate. 
3. Positively engage with international partners, notably in a high-level international forum 
on security sector reform, including though allocating a senior co-Chair, and agree on 
transparent, measurable benchmarks for progress.  
4. Collaborate with international partners in re-launching a working-level cooperation body for 
military reform, based in kinshasa, including through nominating a high-level co-Chair. 
Agree on an international partner to provide appropriate technical and administrative 
support.
5. Take urgent action to address the most pressing short-term requirements for ameliorating 
the performance of the security sector, notably the progressive demilitarization of the East, 
effective action to end corruption in the security services, and bringing the worst military 
human rights abusers to justice, including through requesting appropriate international 
support to meet short-term resource gaps.  
To all DRC’s international partners20
Overcome the legacy of frustration and failure built up since 2006, and use political space 
opening up in kinshasa and the new government’s need for support to generate new political 
will on security sector reform. Provide high-level political commitment and coordination, 
including the appointment of sufficiently senior officials to provide momentum and leadership. 
Robust benchmarks and nuanced conditionality will be essential.  Assistance must be sustained 
for the long term, and founded on a realistic understanding of what is possible. 
6. Re-energize efforts and cooperation on security sector reform in the DRC through concerted 
pressure at the highest level for Congolese Government commitment to effective security 
sector reform.   
7. Collaborate in a broad-based coalition of international and regional actors engaged in the 
DRC, notably through the launch of a high-level forum on security sector reform in the DRC. 
8. Agree benchmarks for progress with the Congolese government, to include; progress on the 
human rights record of the security services, development of a global vision for security and 
a strategic reform plan for the military; and the establishment of an effective coordination 
body on military reform. Put in place a binding series of conditions for on-going political and 
programmatic support. 
9. Ensure that the imperative of effective SSR, and the benchmarks and conditions agreed at the 
high-level forum, are reflected in any new programming decisions or bilateral agreements. 
10. Assist with short-term quick-win projects to raise confidence and open space for broader 
reform, notably progressive demilitarization of conflict-affected areas, anti-corruption 
activities and effective judicial action against human rights abuses committed by the 
security forces, as requested by the Congolese Government, and urge for long-term, 
sustained reform efforts.  
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To the Great Lakes Contact Group (US, UK, EU, UN,  
France, Belgium and the Netherlands) 
11.  Catalyze diplomatic efforts to build a new coalition on SSR, though pro-active high level 
diplomatic contacts with key partners, notably Angola, South Africa, China, the AU and 
SADC, and their inclusion in an expanded Great Lakes Contact Group. 
To the UN Security Council and MONUSCO
12. Generate renewed engagement on security sector reform through an urgent debate on the 
issue. Encourage, in parallel with the AU, the organization of a high-level forum on security 
sector reform in the DRC.
13. Amend the mandate of MONUSCO to include assisting the DRC government on all aspects of 
SSR, including military reform.
14. Increase the resources allocated to the MONUSCO SSR unit, notably in fulfilling its 
mandated task of collating information on existing and planned SSR programs. Remind all 
member states of their responsibility to share information.  
15. Extend the UN sanctions regime to include political and military leaders impeding effective 
SSR and direct the group of experts to provide information about the identity of these 
individuals. 
16. Ensure that the UN system has sufficient in-country resources to make a comprehensive 
assessment of the human rights performance of the Congolese security services. 
To the EU
17.  Renew the mandates of EUSEC and EUPOL, and reflect the imperative for progress on SSR 
in the planned 2012 program review. Stand ready to offer technical assistance to the DRC in 
elaborating a strategic reform plan for the army.
18.  Extend targeted sanctions to individuals hindering effective SSR.  
To the AU 
19. Encourage, in parallel with the UN, the organization of a high-level forum on security sector 
reform in the DRC
20.  Participate actively in the high-level forum and technical cooperation mechanism, including 
through agreement of benchmarks and conditions.
To the World Bank and IMF
21. Expand the assessment criteria for on-going support to the DRC, notably access to the IMF 
loans, to include progress on security sector reform and budget allocations to key priority 
areas, especially  justice. 
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Insecurity: Congo’s Achilles Heel
1. Taking stock of progress in the DRC since 2006 is sobering. 
The war has been over for a decade. An elected government has 
served a full term. Between 2006 and 2010, the DRC received 
considerable external assistance, including more than $14 
billion in official development aid and a UN mission costing 
more than $1 billion a year. Yet this investment has yielded 
little result. Life expectancy and child mortality remain far 
below the Central Africa average. National income per capita 
is less than 50 cents a day21. In fact, the DRC has slipped to last 
place in UN development rankings, 187th out of 187 countries22. 
Public discontentment is rife, and there are concerning signs 
of renewed violence in the East. A decade on from the end of a 
devastating war, and all that has been invested in the DRC risks 
going to waste. The Congolese people deserve better.  
2. The proximate cause of this failure is simple. Congo’s 
population continues to suffer, directly and indirectly, at the 
hands of men with guns. There are an estimated 1.7 million23 
internally displaced people in the DRC, most in the conflict-
affected Eastern provinces, driven from their homes by fear of 
a variety of armed groups – from the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) in the North East, to Mai Mai groups, bandits and Front 
Democratique pour la Liberation de Rwanda (FDLR) rebels 
further South – and at the mercy of malnutrition, ill-health and 
pervasive fear.  
Nearly half a million are refugees outside the country24. 
UNICEF estimates that thousands of children are still being 
used in various capacities by armed groups in DRC, including by 
the Congolese Army25. 
3. This failure is not just indicative of the inability of the 
Congolese security apparatus to defeat these groups. It is 
also the result of abuses at the hands of the security services 
themselves.  A survey of more than 10,000 households in North 
and South Kivu cited the FARDC as the second most common 
source of insecurity, after banditry26. In June and July 2011, 
UN human rights monitors recorded more abuses at the hands 
of the FARDC than armed groups27. Congolese soldiers are 
responsible for some of the rapes reported across Eastern 
DRC28. Members of the security services are also responsible 
for pervasive low-level predation, including involvement in 
illegal resource exploitation and theft29. Many abuses have been 
perpetrated by deserters from the military, or by those reacting 
to abuses at the hands of the army.   
4. Abuse by Congolese security forces extends beyond 
immediately conflict-affected zones. The abuse has been most 
visible in the brutal suppression of political protest or internal 
unrest, notably in the suppression of the Bundu dia kongo 
group, the crushing of MLC forces loyal to Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Soldiers cooking their breakfast on a 
campfire. Many troops are missing basic 
requirements like military issue boots.
The DemocraTic republic of congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector reform8
in kinshasa, and heavy-handed responses to political protests 
around the 2011 elections. It has also been felt in the arbitrary 
arrest or killing of regime opponents, human rights activists 
and journalists, as well as day-to-day predation and lack of 
access to even-handed justice.
5. This is not a new insight. The establishment of an effective 
security sector is the fundamental step to meeting all other 
objectives, from ending the humanitarian crisis, preventing 
human rights abuses, encouraging investment and growth, 
stopping the trade in conflict minerals and preventing  
regional tensions from escalating. Adequate security  is widely 
acknowledged to be a development, economic and geostrategic 
imperative. The Congolese Government recognized its 
pivotal importance in the ‘Governance Compact’ it produced 
immediately after the 2006 elections30, repeated again by 
President kabila in his address to the UN in November 201131. 
All major bilateral and multilateral actors have engaged in a 
wide variety of security sector reform programs, from capacity 
building in the justice system, to rebuilding key infrastructure, 
or training military and police. The UN considers SSR to be 
the process of enhancing effective and accountable security in 
a country and the transformation of “security institutions to 
make them more professional and more accountable”32. Security 
institutions can include the armed forces, police, judiciary and 
others33.
6. Yet despite this consensus, military reform efforts have failed, 
both during the transition and afterwards. They have failed for 
two primary reasons. The first is the lack of political will on the 
part of the Congolese government; the second inadequate and 
poorly coordinated assistance from the donor community.
 Congolese Government:  
Insufficient Political Will
7. The Congolese Government has lacked the will to follow 
through with reforms of the security sector, notably 
the military. A brief look at the record of reform failure 
demonstrates the government has not wanted a professional 
and effective military, as it would constitute a threat to the 
entrenched political and financial interests of the Congolese 
elite, especially  those around the Congolese President. The 
Congolese government stalled on senior appointments to key 
bodies, failed to agree a workable strategic blue-print for reform 
or effectively follow up plans that were agreed34, enabled or 
turned a blind eye to corruption, delayed the passing of essential 
legislation, and consistently undermined donor coordination. 
8. This was in part due to a lack of capacity and a very low 
baseline for reform. The integration of former belligerents 
into unified military and police structures during the 
transition, a process known as ‘brasssage’, was partial and 
ineffective35. Parallel chains of command survived within the 
army and other security structures, and tens of thousands of 
combatants remained in non-state armed groups. Government 
administrative control was weak, notably in the East. The 
post-2006 administration immediately faced a variety of 
armed opponents36. Additionally, sensitivity to international 
interference on security issues was acute - the close supervision 
that the international community had exercised during the 
transition, embodied in CIAT37 and MONUC, had been a source 
of considerable frustration, even humiliation. Memories of 
wartime occupation were vivid, by powers widely perceived 
– rightly or wrongly – to be acting on behalf of elements of 
the international community38. The government is defensive 
of its autonomy, and wary of dealing collectively with the 
international community.
Officers’ Quarters at Camp katindo in Goma, North 
kivu province. Originally intended to house 150 
people, the camp is now home to more than 16,000 
people including many soldiers’ families.
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9. But these issues are as much a result of continued failures of 
SSR as they are the cause – and they do not present a compelling 
reason to ignore the need for SSR. The fact remains that the 
Congolese government consistently failed to give sufficient 
political backing for serious change. Most importantly, it did not 
take steps to end corruption, ill-discipline and weak command 
structures undermining reform efforts in the security sector. 
Despite President kabila’s high-profile declaration of ‘zero 
tolerance’ for sexual violence and corruption in July 2009, 
not enough has changed on the ground. Support to justice, 
investigation and anti-corruption efforts are minimal and 
inadequate – the Justice Ministry was allocated just 0.1% of 
government spending in 201139, and its budget reportedly fell by 
47% between 2007 and 200940. Many in senior positions in the 
government and military continue to profit from corruption, 
either in raking off salaries, taking kickbacks, or involvement in 
illegal mining, trade or protection rackets. 
10. No comprehensive national vision exists for defense and 
security policies, despite UN Security Council insistence and the 
emphasis placed on SSR in the government itself. A blueprint 
for the Congolese military has been developed, after many false 
starts41, and has finally been given legal foundation with the 
promulgation, in 2011, of much delayed legislation42.  
A joint committee on justice reform was formed in 2005, the 
‘Comite Mixte de la Justice’, co-chaired by the Minister of 
Justice and a senior diplomat, and a three year ‘priority action 
plan’ for the justice sector was launched in 2007. A coordination 
body for police reform, the ‘Comite de Suivi de la Reforme de la 
Police’ was launched by the Ministry of Interior in 200843. 
11. Though they represent positive steps forward, these bodies 
are reportedly of mixed effectiveness44, suffer from poorly-
defined roles and tensions between stakeholders, and are not 
part of a comprehensive strategy for security. The army reform 
plan has not been followed up with practical planning for 
implementation45, remains theoretical and is routinely bypassed 
or undermined in day-to-day decision-making. Changes to 
military structures such as the ‘regimentation’ process of 201146, 
for instance, bear no relation to the vision enshrined in official 
military planning. The Presidential Guard and intelligence 
services have been systematically excluded from reform, and 
remain completely unaccountable. Salaries for police and 
soldiers, despite some limited increases, remain inadequate and 
frequently unpaid47. An ICC indictee, Bosco Ntaganda, holds 
high rank in the military48. Senior positions remain unfilled, 
and formal command structures are routinely bypassed. 
Most military families cannot afford to send their 
children to school. Children often work from a 
young age to contribute to the family income.
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International Community:  
Inadequate and Incoherent
12. The second aspect key to understanding SSR efforts since 
2006 is the attitudes and actions of the international community. 
The international community has been frequently criticized for 
political incoherence, leading to inadequate, incompatible and 
ineffective interventions, based on short-term national priorities 
and imperatives rather than achieving meaningful, sustainable 
reform49. There is a long list of donors and agencies that have 
engaged in reform or training of elements of the security 
services50. These efforts have not resulted in meaningful, 
sustained improvements, let alone the transformation in 
attitudes and effectiveness required. 
13. The international community had been remarkably unified 
up to 2006. Under the leadership of an activist UN mission and 
heavy-hitting SRSG, and coordinated through a body, CIAT, 
with legal standing under the transitional arrangements, 
the widely agreed goal of elections drove policy. But once the 
transition was completed, divisions began to appear. Some of 
the signatories to this report urged the creation of a successor 
organization to CIAT, but the Congolese government rejected 
it as unacceptable. In the absence of a ‘lead nation’51, and with 
the UN looking towards managing its departure, there was 
no overarching authority to harmonize police and, following 
elections, no single goal to work towards. International forums, 
notably the Great Lakes Contact Group, which had a broad 
membership52 during the transition, swiftly devolved to include 
only traditional donors, and policy coherence even within 
multilateral organizations such as the EU fractured53. Pressure 
on the Congolese Government to sustain reform faltered. 
14. The success of the 2006 elections resulted in attention 
across much of the international community turning away 
from the DRC. With the DRC redefined in many capitals as a 
‘post-conflict’ state, resources were reallocated to concentrate 
on other issues of immediate concern across Africa. Policy was 
recalibrated to reflect this new reality. Many donors looked 
to long-term development. Despite manifest needs, official 
development spending on security-related programs between 
2006 and 2010 was just $530 million, roughly 6% of the total54 
- this drops to just 1% for projects working on security system 
management and reform. This figure is alarmingly low given 
the fundamental importance of an effective security sector in 
protecting civilians, and in achieving all other development 
objectives.
15. And, far from being ‘post-conflict’, the DRC continued to 
suffer from extremely serious bouts of violence.  Through the 
post-2006 period, successive spikes of conflict or regional tension 
left the international community scrambling to address acute 
short-term political crises or humanitarian emergencies. There 
were demands for immediate action against armed groups such 
as the CNDP, FDLR or LRA - necessitating the mass deployment 
of ineffective and poorly trained FARDC units55.  
Political settlements with Congolese armed groups, notably the 
CNDP, resulted in the unplanned, ad hoc integration of tens of 
thousands of former rebels and indicted war criminals into the ranks 
of the Congolese army56. Demobilization programs have unwittingly 
encouraged a churn of individuals from disarmament to recruitment. 
All of these factors are incompatible with strategic reform.
16. International incoherence has perhaps been most acutely felt in 
relation to SSR, particularly military reform, despite consistent calls 
for harmonization57. Technical coordination on the ground has been 
mixed. As seen above, committees bringing together donors, agencies 
and the Congolese government have been established on police and 
justice. They are functional, albeit with uncertain effectiveness. But 
no coordination body exists between the Congolese government 
and donors in relation to the military, worsened by the Congolese 
Government’s infamous refusal to coordinate SSR attempts with its 
different partners. 
17. This is reflected by a failure of coordination between members of 
the international community themselves. There have been attempts 
at harmonization, including informal consultations between 
Defense Attaches in kinshasa agreeing a local division of labor, 
an Ambassadors Forum on SSR chaired by the UN, and regular 
diplomatic frameworks such as regular meetings of EU Heads of 
Mission. But while ad hoc communication may have avoided the most 
egregious duplication of effort, it was insufficient to generate real 
coherence, or political momentum for reform. Many resist sharing the 
detail, or even the fact, of their programs. There is no consolidated list 
of SSR-related interventions58, or a comprehensive record of bilateral 
military programs and financing. Given the weakness of Congolese 
administrative capacity, it is likely that not even the Congolese 
government had a coherent picture of  SSR activities at any one time. 
A commander inspects his troops. Formal command 
structures in the FARDC are routinely bypassed.
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18. The result has been a range of disconnected bilateral 
initiatives on training, sensitization, infrastructure 
rehabilitation or capacity building. There have been some 
successes, notably in relation to justice and police59, and in the 
performance of some military units, though many were short-
lived, due to a subsequent lack of support - accommodation, 
equipment and salaries – or the break-up of units. Some offers 
of training have not been taken up, with centers and instructors 
standing idle. There have been attempts to engage with 
structural issues within the FARDC undertaken by MONUSCO60 
and EUSEC, a mission of the European Union launched in 
2005. Involving small numbers of embedded European officers, 
EUSEC has had some success in relation to the ‘chain of 
payments’ – ensuring salaries reach individual soldiers – and 
in conducting a census of FARDC personnel, as well as in 
administrative reform61. But while these initiatives have been 
valuable, they are not sufficient to bring about systemic change. 
19. This is by no means the exclusive responsibility of donors. 
As argued above, all coordination attempts suffered from 
patchy or inadequate engagement and political obstruction by 
the Congolese authorities. This has been most acutely felt by 
the UN. The most obvious candidate to carry out the role of 
in-country coordination is MONUSCO. But while it has a unit 
devoted to SSR, and has been mandated by the Security Council 
to act as coordinator and information hub since 2008, it has 
not been sufficiently well resourced, and was systematically 
undermined by a Congolese government reluctant for the UN 
to play such a prominent role. MONUSCO essentially stopped 
facilitating collective discussion on SSR following the demise of 
the Ambassadors Forum, which has been moribund since 2010. It 
currently has no mandate to engage in military reform.
The Shared Imperative of SSR
20. In combination, these factors have resulted in the view that 
the Congolese security sector, and particularly its military, are 
simply too dysfunctional for reform to be achieved. The result 
has been an increasing detachment on SSR. Support for military 
reform is now frequently subsumed under wider stabilization 
efforts62, or framed as a response to a specific threat, such as the 
US project to train units to tackle the LRA63. Though numerous 
projects are on-going to improve the justice system and build 
police capacity64, and some progress has been made, the most 
important challenge facing the country, namely systemic 
transformation of the military, has largely been abandoned. 
Initiatives on large-scale FARDC training reduced to the point 
that only two bilateral programs were reported to be operational 
in January 201165. 
21. This is compounded by the view that pushing the DRC 
government to take serious action is too dangerous to attempt - 
that effective sanctions would generate a political backlash, disrupt 
bilateral relationships, and risk defections, mutiny or insurrection. 
This is certainly the case in relation to entrenched corrupt 
networks and the impunity of the most infamous war criminals. 
22. But this view must no longer be allowed to dominate. The 
status quo, of failed reform and popular discontent, presents 
far greater dangers.  The most significant risk of renewed 
conflict comes from within the Congolese security services itself,  
particularly the FARDC66, and from the inability of the Congolese 
government to control its territory or protect its people67. Reform 
of the security sector would no doubt bring short-term pain, but 
the long-term risk of inaction is far greater. The human, political 
and financial cost of the DRC again collapsing back into war is 
difficult to fathom. 
Congolese police patrol the main streets of Goma.
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23. Yet these costs would be felt by all of the DRC’s external 
partners. China struck a landmark deal with the DRC 
government in 2007, exchanging a $6 billion investment in 
infrastructure – building roads, hospitals and universities 
– in return for long-term access to Congolese mineral 
resources, extending decades68. Internal and regional 
stability will be vital for this deal to come to fruition, 
demanding an effective security sector. South African 
companies have invested heavily in the DRC, and peace in the 
DRC and across Central Africa will be vital for its long term 
prosperity69. And Angola, the DRC’s key regional security 
partner, considers chaos across the border to be a  core threat 
to its national security70. It too needs an effective Congolese 
state.  All three states have already engaged in bilateral 
reform and retraining. 
24. Regional organizations, most importantly the African 
Union (AU) and the Southern Africa Development Committee 
(SADC) have a pressing and legitimate interest in regional 
prosperity and stability. And the international financial 
institutions – frequently cited as the actors with the most 
significant leverage and access in kinshasa71 - are committed 
to helping the DRC achieve sustained economic growth. 
The IMF is the only actor currently providing direct budget 
support to the DRC government72.
25. Reform is not only vitally necessary, it is possible. 
Compared to 2003 or 2006, political and military conditions in 
the DRC are now such that renewed, joint efforts on SSR could 
yield real and lasting results.  The transition was characterized 
by acute political competition between wartime enemies, 
enmeshed in an unwieldy political structure. The years 
immediately after saw a fragile new government challenges 
by sustained and serious violence. Both acted as severe 
constraints on the possibilities for reform73. 
26. These constraints are now less acute. Congolese non-
state armed groups may be reduced in number and scope74. 
Foreign armed groups are significantly less powerful than 
in the past75. Though both remain a considerable threat to 
civilians, neither presents the same challenge they once did to 
regional peace and security, or to the kinshasa government. 
The political context has also changed. President kabila and 
his government are facing a crisis of legitimacy. The 2011 
elections were roundly criticized by international and Congolese 
election monitors, and have little popular credibility. The single 
most telling step that the government could take to rebuild its 
reputation at home and abroad, and to improve the lot of the 
population, would be to undertake meaningful reform of the 
security apparatus. There have been some promising signs 
recently. For example, the Commissioner General of the National 
Police in March 2012 publicly asked the international community 
for assistance in completing the police reform process76.
27. The overriding need for meaningful SSR cannot be 
questioned. There is a broad synergy of interests across the 
international community and the DRC’s neighbors, economic 
partners and population. The timing is right. It will be a long 
and difficult road, but the first step to unlocking a more hopeful 
future for the population is simple. The Congolese government 
must take responsibility for serious, sustained and strategic 
reform, particularly of the military, backed by political 
commitment at the very highest levels. 
28. The international community must recognize this 
imperative. It must act on it. All other objectives – 
humanitarian, developmental, economic or security-related 
– will be difficult or impossible to achieve without concerted 
SSR. The DRC’s external partners must make a collective 
stand on serious security sector reform, both to engender 
political will and to support resulting Congolese reform 
processes. The Congolese government has received significant 
financial and diplomatic support since the end of the war. The 
weight of these commitments must be brought to bear.
A military family living in Camp katindo, North 
kivu. Most families in the sprawling army camp 
live in tents or makeshift structures.
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A New Deal on SSR
29. It is a new political commitment that is urgently needed 
above all, on both sides. The international community 
should seek to strike a new collective pact with the Congolese 
Government on SSR. This need not involve the immediate 
allocation of significant new resources. In the absence of political 
will and the establishment of oversight structures, significant new 
programs could be counter-productive, replacing functions that 
need to be carried out by government. Though investment will 
certainly be necessary, a new push on SSR need not be expensive 
in the short-term. 
30. Such a pact would see political backing and coordinated, 
targeted programmatic support exchanged for Congolese 
leadership and robust benchmarks on progress towards 
mutually agreed goals. It would need to involve all international 
actors engaged in the DRC, including the traditional donor 
community, newer international actors including China and 
South Africa, the DRC’s neighbors either bilaterally or through 
regional organizations (AU and SADC), and the international 
financial institutions. It would demand renewed commitment, 
coordination and communication, robust benchmarks, and 
quick-win confidence raising projects. 
31. It should be launched in a spirit of transparency and 
collaboration, recognizing that a new effort on SSR is a need 
shared by the Congolese government, its people, and all of its 
economic, diplomatic and development partners. An overly 
confrontational attitude on the part of the international 
community could cause an unhelpful political backlash 
– managing tensions will require astute and fleet-footed 
diplomacy, and a leading role to be played by African actors. But 
equally, no one should be under any illusion as to difficulties that 
will need to be faced – there is no magic bullet to security sector 
reform in the DRC. It needs sustained political commitment 
above all. There will be disagreements, with Congolese 
Government, and between elements of the international 
community. Such a push will need sustained, high-level political 
commitment, and must be backed by real conditions. 
Coordinate and Communicate
32. Renewed coordination among all partners at both political 
and technical levels is an essential pre-requisite. A broad-based 
coalition of international partners will be vital, including 
African bilateral actors, regional organizations – notably SADC 
and the African Union – the DRC’s key economic partners, and 
traditional donors. This would enable on-going information 
sharing and ensure complementarity of support, as well as 
ensuring coherent and concerted messaging. This could 
initially be generated by an expanded Great Lakes ‘Contact 
Group’, bringing together all players to agree to parameters of 
benchmarks and follow-up. This would need to be backed with 
active diplomacy by key donors – the US, EU, UK, France and 
Belgium – to bring in the most important African bilateral 
actors, China and multilateral organizations essential to 
managing political fall-out in kinshasa. 
33. Such a forum should launch a high-level political follow-up 
mechanism on SSR in the DRC, under the auspices of the AU 
and UN, and the joint leadership of the Congolese Government, 
that would bring together all parties, including donors and 
multilateral actors. It is also vital that it include representatives 
of Congolese civil society. Successful reform will depend on the 
input of the Congolese population, at all levels, and their views 
must be heard. The forum should meet quarterly, and provide 
for on-going oversight and a mechanism for the resolution 
of disputes or disagreement. It should also seek to address 
problems of policy incoherence, linking an on-going assessment 
of political conditions to decision making in multilateral bodies 
such as the IMF and World Bank. 
34. Finally, a new working level cooperation mechanism 
on military reform should be launched in kinshasa, again 
co-chaired by the Congolese government, with support or a 
permanent secretariat provided by MONUSCO, EUSEC or a 
mutually acceptable alternative. It would ensure harmonization, 
communication and effective burden-sharing. It would also map 
on-going and planned programs and interventions, maintain 
comprehensive project database, and act as a communication 
hub between donors, government and civil society.  
Military wives seek to supplement their income with 
small-scale trade in the local markets. “We have to beg 
for support from our acquaintances. The government 
does not support us at all,” said one soldier.
The DemocraTic republic of congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector reform14
Benchmarking
35. Though a new partnership should be launched in a spirit 
of positive collaboration, it should also be backed by robust, 
binding benchmarks. These would need to be discussed and 
calibrated against a realistic assessment of what is achievable. 
They should center on two key areas. The first key benchmark 
should be rooted in the human rights performance of the 
Congolese security services. This is a metric that would reflect 
whether soldiers or police are violating human rights, whether 
war criminals in the military have been arrested or removed 
(through vetting and effective military justice),  and would act 
as a proxy for improved internal discipline and the coherence of 
formal command structures. Information is already collated by 
the UN Joint Human Rights Office, and could be complimented 
by Congolese human rights organizations, international NGOs 
or ad hoc bodies such as those authorized by UN sanctions 
bodies. Progress should be reported on a quarterly basis to the 
political follow-up mechanism. The MONUSCO mandate should 
provide for increased resources to monitor progress on SSR. 
36. The second should be the development and implementation 
of a practical path for FARDC reform. Legislation passed in 
2010 and promulgated by the Congolese President in 2011 
provides a framework, enshrining in law a long term vision 
for the security sector.  A practical plan for its achievement is 
urgently necessary. Appropriate technical support should be 
made available via MONUSCO, EUSEC or an alternative.  
Consequences
37. These conditions must be backed by real consequences in 
the event of continued failure or obstruction. This would not 
necessarily need to include hard conditionality on development 
spending or humanitarian aid, which would endanger the 
poorest and most vulnerable, and would risk a political backlash 
from Congolese actors that reduced rather than expanded the 
space available for reform. But there are many other avenues 
for international leverage, starting with sustained political and 
diplomatic pressure at the highest levels. These could include: 
 
•  A publicly available quarterly progress report discussed at each 
meeting of the high-level political follow-up mechanism; 
 
•  Explicit linkage of progressive MONUSCO draw-down with 
successful SSR, as measured by agreed criteria; 
 
•  A sliding-scale of suspension of financing, projects, grants 
and aid disbursements, with excess funding transferred to 
supporting civil society, Parliamentary oversight, humanitarian 
needs or governance mechanisms;    
 
•  A moratorium on non-essential inward and outward visits by 
senior officials and ministers, and the hosting of large-scale 
conferences and events in the DRC77; and  
 
•  Extension of UN and EU targeted sanctions to military and 
political figures blocking security sector reform. 
FARDC troops assemble for inspection.
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Confidence-Building
38. Rather than looking immediately to long-term objectives, the 
high-level forum should, in the first instance, seek to elaborate 
achievable, realistic and high-impact short-term projects, to 
raise confidence and open space for reform. The first steps would 
need to be focused on minimizing the harm done by elements of 
the Congolese security apparatus to the civilians in their areas 
of deployment, and beginning to tackle the corruption and ill-
discipline that undermine all other efforts. These would again 
need to be discussed and agreed, but could take three initial 
forms – the progressive demilitarization of the East, action on 
corruption, and prosecution of those guilty of the most serious 
human rights abuses. 
39. Demilitarization would bring multiple benefits. The East of the 
DRC, particularly the kivus, has seen large-scale deployments of 
Congolese military78. By moving troops to barracks, away from 
contact with civilians, it would remove one of the key sources 
of insecurity for the population. Having the majority of troops 
in barracks would allow salaries and support to be monitored, 
removing the need for income from illegal trade, predation or 
corruption. And it would allow structures to be mapped, training 
needs to be assessed, and discipline rebuilt. It would thus both 
protect civilians and simultaneously open space for reform.  It 
would need to be progressive and carefully considered, so that the 
most vulnerable were not left open to attack by non-state armed 
groups, and MONUSCO would need to fill any resulting security 
vacuums. Necessary international support to the process would 
include provision of sufficient barracks, support to redeployed 
troops and dependents, and logistics. Such support could be 
coordinated by the UN though MONUSCO and the ISSSS, already 
engaged in similar projects in conflict affected regions.  
40. The second would be to take on the entrenched corrupt 
networks that have undermined reform. This would be a 
necessary step in pursuing demilitarization – without the 
expectation of support, soldiers might refuse to deploy away  
from resource-rich areas, or simply prey on the population 
around barracks. It would also bring enormous long-term 
benefits in building formal command structures, discipline and 
capacity. This would be the key litmus test of high-level political 
will in kinshasa – it is a truism in anti-corruption initiatives  
that enforcement mechanisms are ineffective in the absence 
 of commitment at the highest levels. It would demand  
the clarification of senior command structures,  
the strengthening of central administrative control,  
and the appointment of capable personnel.
41. Third, significant steps should be taken to bring to justice 
those members of the security forces accused of the most serious 
human rights abuses, including those in the most senior ranks. 
Not only would this be of clear benefit in its own right, it would 
send a message that criminality on the part of members of the 
military or police would no longer be tolerated, and be a vital 
step to changing the ethos of the security services. This would 
demand significant support to the capacity of Congolese military 
and civilian justice systems. 
42. These three goals interlock, and would constitute a 
significant test of Congolese political will. Once they were 
achieved, and the steps outlined above taken, longer-term 
necessities - such as reducing the number of personnel in both 
police and military, and conducting a thorough vetting of all 
personnel – could begin to be planned and implemented. 
The rudimentary hospital in the camp provides 
basic medical services to military families.
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Learn from successes – and failures
43. Finally, the international community should learn the 
lessons of the past. The implementation of MONUSCO’s 
conditionality policy - whereby peacekeepers do not work with 
Congolese personnel guilty of human rights abuses - shows that 
perpetrators can be identified and held to account79 if made 
a priority. Improved rates of arrest and trial for sexual and 
gender-based violence (SGBV) in the Kivu provinces, notably 
the prosecution of a Lieutenant Colonel for rape in 201180, show 
that justice is possible with the right combination of training, 
material support and political attention. That this landmark 
judgment was delivered by a ‘mobile gender court’ – a long-
standing Congolese solution to delivering justice in remote 
areas – demonstrates the importance of working flexibly within 
Congolese realities. The court was supported by the American 
Bar Association, using funding from an international NGO, and 
worked with the Congolese judicial system, local government 
and civil society81.   
44. Additionally, more than 30,000 children have successfully 
been demobilized from armed groups since 2006 through 
interventions executed in concert with the Congolese 
government, UN agencies and local Congolese organizations. 
Children and adolescents who join armed groups whether 
through force or ignorance have a difficult time returning 
to their homes and communities if they are demobilized. 
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs 
supported by UNICEF make a difference by reuniting some 
with their families and communities and supporting others in 
vocational training programs82.  
45. The EUSEC project on reform of the Congolese military 
demonstrates that structural reform need not be expensive if 
support is correctly targeted. EUSEC was launched in 2005 and 
embedded small numbers of European officers at senior levels 
in both headquarters and with individual units. Designed to 
offer strategic advice and targeted support, its most significant 
initiatives have been working on the ‘chain of payments’ – 
ensuring salaries reached individual soldiers – undertaking a 
census of FARDC personnel, developing a ‘logistics doctrine’ 
for the FARDC, and conducting administrative training. The 
census started in 2006, and has been able to offer a far more 
reliable idea of numbers of serving soldiers than was previously 
available83. The strategic purpose of interventions matters more 
than their cost.  
46. The positive performance of military units trained by the 
US, Belgium and South Africa demonstrate that improvements in 
conduct and discipline are possible. Many police units trained for 
the 2006 elections were reported to have functioned well. But once 
elections were past, support dropped away, and the trained units 
swiftly degraded, with equipment going missing, unit structures 
being broken up and discipline slipping84. Training and equipment 
are vital, but attention also needs to be sustained.
A soldier at home in his barracks, katindo Camp, Goma.
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ANNEX I –OECD statistics on spending in the DRC
Fig 1. OECD Development spending 2006-201085 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Disbursed 2234.573 1448.157 1928.990 2548.207 5972.137 14,132.064
Committed 2175.442 1983.223 2224.644 3083.140 3732.631 13,199.1
This gives a headline total of more than $13 billion in official 
development commitments to the DRC between 2006 and 2010, 
and more than $14 billion in disbursements. This translates to 
an overall financial commitment of $2.8 billion a year between 
2006 and 2010. 
However, debt relief for past projects causes a sharp spike 
in total disbursements in 2010 (see below for more detail on 
debt relief). Thus, though indicative of the level of financial 
support received by the DRC, it does not necessarily reflect 
actual year-on-year resource flows. 
Fig 2. OECD development spending 2006-2010 (excluding debt)86
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Disbursed 1198.729 1156.323 1754.167 2338.246 2116.93 8,564.395
Committed 1183.808 1740.224 2099.748 2939.14 2282.966 10,254.651
Non-debt related development commitments totaled roughly 
$10.2 billion between 2006 and 2010, with disbursements at 
$8.5 billion, and an average commitment of just over $2 billion 
a year. This spending was overwhelmingly on project aid.  
Official disbursed budget support was just $474 million,  
or 5.5%, largely from the IMF and EU in 2009 and 2010, as 
well as some ‘emergency’ budget support to assist the DRC to 
achieve HIPC completion point, and pay teachers’ salaries, 
which was not necessarily included in OECD statistics87. 
Fig 3. OECD development spending on ‘Conflict, Peace and Security’ (disbursement only)88
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
‘Conflict, Peace and Se-
curity’
99.99 73.96 89.4 124.83 142.32 530.51
‘Security System Manage-
ment and Reform’
1.05 8.02 19.64 21.48 35.60 85.79
Thus disbursed development spending on conflict peace and 
security between 2006 and 2010 is equivalent to 3.75% of the 
headline financial commitment to the DRC of $14 billion and on 
security system management makes up 0.6%. If compared to 
total development spending excluding debt relief over the same 
Fig 4. MONUC/MONUSCO budget89
2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 Total
1091.242 1112.739 1187.676 1346.584 1365 6099
The total operating budget for the UN peacekeeping mission 
totaled $6.099 billion between July 2006 and July 2011.  
The US paid 27.14% of peacekeeping costs, or $1.47 billion,  
over the same period, the Uk paid 8.15%, or $499 million,  
and France paid 7.55%, or $463 million. 
period, the equivalent figures are 6.19% and 1% respectively.  
By comparison, disbursements on humanitarian aid were 
$1.875 billion over the same period, or 21.89% of total  
development spending, excluding debt. 
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These figures do not include peacekeeping (see above), bilateral 
military assistance or contributions via multilateral agencies. 
They do not include assistance provided by non-OECD mem-
bers, such as China, Angola, and South Africa, for which no 
comprehensive set of spending data exists.  
The largest multilateral agencies in the DRC over this period 
were the EU and International Development Agency (World 
Bank). The IDA disbursed a total of $1.47 billion between 2006 
and 2010 (excluding debt relief), and the EU disbursed $1.2 
billion in the same period.  
Fig. 6 Development spending by Contact Group core members, 2006-2010  
disbursements, excluding debt91)
US Uk France Belgium The Netherlands Total
970.544 849.058 130.457 758.833 199.155 2908.047








389.5 528.4 478.2 511.2 498.6
Under MDRI 4.5 14.8 16.8 18.9 19.8
Total 394 543.2 495 530.1 518.4
Again, these figures do not include contributions to multilateral 
agencies, to peacekeeping, or to bilateral military programs.  
These numbers give the best estimate of the annual savings  
to the DRC through debt relief initiatives92. They also represent 
the annual cost to the creditors of agreeing this debt relief.  
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